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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal the district court's dismissal of Appellant Fields' petition for 
postconviction relief, in which he sought the benefit of a newly acknowledged rule guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment: if a convicted defendant may be sentenced to death only after one or more 
additional facts are found to exist, he is entitled to have a jury determine the existence of those 
additional facts. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002). Fields seeks a determination by this 
Court that as a matter of state law, Ring should have been retroactively applied to his case and 
the district court should have been granted his petition and a new sentencing proceeding. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS & STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time of Petitioner's trial, eligibility for death turned on the trial court making a 
statutorily required fact-finding. Specifically, a defendant was eligible for death only if the trial 
court found a statutory aggravating circumstance to exist.' In Petitioner's trial, the court 
complied with this. The jury was released upon returning its verdict, after which the trial court 
found a statutory aggravating circumstance to exist and made additional fact-findings before 
sentencing the Petitioner to death. On direct appeal, this Court rejected the argument that Fields' 
sentencing proceeding was constitutionally infirm for lack of jury determination of an 
aggravating circumstance, specific intent to kill during the commission of a felony. State v. 
Fields, Nos. 19185 & 19809, Brief of Appellant at 57-58 (Idaho Supreme Court, filed Jan. 27, 
'Also in lceeping with the statutory scheme then in effect, the trial court was required to 
select the sentence. Whether it elected to sentence the defendant to death or a lesser penalty 
turned on certain additional fact-findings which the trial court was statutorily required to make. 
r.c. 419-2515. 
1994). See State v. Fields, 127 Idaho 904,916, 908 P.2d 121 1, 1223 (1995). At a subsequent 
post-conviction in 1995, Fields again raised the issue of his denial of a jwy determination of facts 
necessary for aggravating circumstances, which was denied by the district court and affirmed on 
appeal. Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 17 P.3d 230 (2000). 
The statutory sentencing scheme under which Petitioner was tried was enacted in its 
original form in 1977. Idaho Code Section 19-2515 (1977). While various amendments were 
made to the scheme over time, Fields was tried in all respects relevant to this appeal under the 
original capital statutory scheme as enacted in 1977. 
Within forty-two days of the Ring decision, Fields sought redress by filing in the district 
court (I) a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence under Idaho Criminal Rule 35, and (2) a 
postconvictioil proceeding under Idaho Code Section 19-2719, alternatively denominated a 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to Idaho Constitution. CR at 5-36. Fields explicitly 
raised the claim that the state courts were not bound to a federal retroactivity standard and urged 
that he be granted relief under state retroactivity law. CR 65-72, 174-76. The district court 
denied the Rule 35 motion and rejected the postcoilviction claims. CR at 293-304. Fields 
timely appealed. CR at 307. By the time Ring was decided in 2002, the original conviction, 
sentence and judgment against Fields was final. 
As Fields was seeking relief in Idaho state courts, the United States Supreme Court 
decided that, as a matter of federal law, Ring was not retroactively applicable to individuals 
whose cases were final when Ring was decided. Schviro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004). 
Ln this Court's lead case on the matter, Porter 1 .  State, 140 Idaho 780, 102 P. 3d 1099 
(2004), the Court declined to retroactively apply Ring "under a more lenient [state] standard of 
retroactivity," finding that the issue raised by Porter was "based solely upon the Federal 
Constitution" making "the question of retroactivity of that decision [I a matter for federal law, 
not state law." Porter at 783, 1102. See also, State v. Hof fan ,  142 Idaho 27, 121 P.3d 958 
(200.5), and State v. Leavitt, 141 Idaho 895, 120 P. 3d 283 (2005). 
Last year, the United States Supreme Court held that federal retroactivity doctrine, 
initially set out in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion), "limits the kinds of 
constitutional violations that will entitle an individual to relief on federal habeas, but does not in 
any way limit the authority of a state court, when reviewing its own stale criminal convictions, to 
provide a remedy for a violation that is deemed 'nonretroactive' under Teague. " Danforth v. 
Minnesota, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 1042 (2008).2 The district court mentioned the Danforth decision 
in its opinion dismissing Fields' petition, acknowledging that States are "free to evaluate whether 
the new rule should be applied retroactively," CR at 297, but it did not further analyze the case 
under the retroactivity doctrines that it identified under state law. See CR at 299 (identifying 
three part test, BHA Investments, Inc. v. City ofBoise, 141 Idaho 168, 108 P.3d 315 (2004)); CR 
at 297 (identifying "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty test" o f In  re Goford, 127 Idaho, 
472, 903 P.2d 61 (199.5). Instead the district court cited what it considered to be the binding 
precedent of Porter and Hoffman as the basis for rejecting Fields' claims. CR at 299-300. 
'Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court remanded five other Idaho capital 
cases for reconsideration in light of its opinion in Danforth v. Minnesota. Rhoades v. Idaho, 128 
S.Ct. 1441 (2008) (mem.); McKinney v. Idaho, 128 S.Ct. 1441 (2008) (mem.); Pizzuto v. Idaho, 
128 S.Ct. 1441 (2008) (mern.); Card v. Idaho, 128 S.Ct 1442 (2008) (mem.); Hairston v. Idaho, 
128 S.Ct. 1442 (2008) (mem.). 
111. ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Whether in light of Idaho's long history of jury participation in sentencing in capital 
cases, the fundamental role which the right to jury fact-finding plays in our conception of justice, 
and the Court's consistent use of Idaho's established test for determining which new court 
decisions should be given retroactive effect, Ring should be applied retroactively to provide 
Petitioner a remedy for the indisputable denial of his constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury 
trial on whether the facts necessary to make him eligible for a death sentence existed. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Fields is not before the Court seeking wiildfall relief on an issue he is litigating for the 
first time in light of an unanticipated favorable ruling. He previously lost the issue in one form 
or another on direct appeal and a successive post-conviction proceeding before this Court. This 
Court consistently has rejected the argument whenever (and by whomever) it was raised. After 
Furman struck down death penalty statutes across the nation in 1972, general uncertainty reigned 
for many years in the death penalty arena. In the midst of the confusion, Idaho courts repeatedly 
overruled capital defendants objections to jury-free penalty phase proceedings. Many courts read 
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), to hold that there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury 
participation in sentencing proceedings. 
However, acknowledging it had erred in Walton, the United States Supreme Court held in 
2002 that where a convicted defendant may be sentenced to death only after one or more 
additional facts are found to exist, he is entitled to have a jury determine the existence of those 
additional facts. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002). The statutory scheme under which 
Fields was sentenced required that the State could sentence him to death only after one or more 
additional facts were found to exist, and the trial court conducted the required fact-finding. It is, 
therefore, beyond dispute that Fields' death sentence cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
Funda~liental fainless requires that this urtconstitutional sentence be remedied. Withholding a 
remedy because the United States Supreme Court took until 2002 to acknowledge Fields' 
position was correct all along cannot be squared with any basic conception of justice. This Court 
has the authority to correct this basic injustice. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 1041-42 
(2008) (federal non-retroactivity doctrine, intended to limit federal court authority to overturn 
state convictions, does not limit state court authority to grant relief for violations of new rules of 
constitutional law). 
In addition to basic fairness requiring remedial measures, longstanding and consistently 
applied Idaho precedent requires the retroactive application of Ring. In particular, this Court 
determines whether a new rule annou~~ced in a court decision will be retroactively applied by 
balancing the first against the remaining two of three factors, i.e.- it balances (1) the purpose of 
the new rule against (2) the reliance on the prior decisions of this Court and (3) the effect of the 
new rule on the administration ofjustice. There is no cause for departure from this test. In this 
case, stare decisis controls that application of the state rule of retroactivity. 
Applied here, this test overwhelmingly favors the full retroactive application of Xing. 
The purpose of Ring is to ensure that juries determine the existence (or non-existence) of any fact 
necessary to increase the upper range of a convicted first degree murder defendant's possible 
sentence from life to death in order to enforce the Sixth Amendment's dual purpose of ensuring 
jury trials to individual defendants and participation in serious criminal trials by the community, 
thereby ensuring that com~nunity values are reflected in the sentence imposed. As for reliance, 
the State has no legitimate interest in relying on unconstitutional laws or in death sentences 
obtained unconstitutionally, so can have no such interest in standing by sentences already 
achieved tlxough such laws. Applying Ring retroactively will have a substantial positive but, at 
most, only a minimal negative impact on the administration ofjustice. Consequently, under 
Idaho's retroactivity test, Ring should be applied to Mr. Fields 
B. RING'S HISTORICAL CONTEXT INFORMS ANY RETROACTIVITY 
ANALYSIS. 
Idaho's 1977 capital statutory scheme, in all relevant respects identical to the statutory 
scheme under which Petitioner was tried, was one of a series of necessary state court responses to 
changing federal Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in the 1970s. Modem capital jurisprudence 
was born with the United States Supreme Court striking down capital statutofy schemes 
throughout the Nation in 1972. Furrnan v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman held that 
states must provide capital sentencers guidance on how to determine whether to impose the death 
penalty. "[U]nquestionably [Idaho's] pre-1973 statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution under . . . Furman[.]" State v. Lindquist, 99 Idaho 
766,768, 589 P.2d 101, 103 (1979). Responding to Furman, in 1973 Idaho revised its death 
penalty scheme making death sentences mandatory for "[elvery person guilty of murder in the 
first degree[.]" Idaho Code $18-4004 (am. 1973). Three years later, the United States Supreme 
Court struck down a mandatory death penalty statute virtually identical to Idaho's revised statute. 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). In an effort to align its death penalty scheme 
with Woodson, in 1977 Idaho removed from the jury its traditional role as adjudicator of who, 
among capital defendants, would live and who would die. Specifically, and relevant to the 
question now before the Court, was the Idaho modified scheme provision that before a defendant 
could face a range of penalties which included death, a court had to find that at least one 
statutory aggravating circumstance existed. I.C. 19-25 15 (1 977). 
Despite Idaho's long history of, and its constitutional reverence for, the right to a jury 
trial, when confronted with the question of whether the United States or Idaho Constitutions 
guaranteed the right to jury participation in the capital sentencing process, a narrow majority of 
this Court "held that there is no federal constitutional requirement ofjury participation in the 
sentencing process and that the decision to have jury participation in the sentencing process, as 
contrasted with judicial discretion sentencing, is within the policy determination of the individual 
states." State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 15,966 P.2d 1, 15 (1998) (quoting Creech v. Arave, 105 
Idaho 362,373,670 P.2d 463,474 (1983)). This Court later held that "Art. 1, $7 of the Idaho 
Constitution does not require participation of a july in the sentencing process in a capital case." 
State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 904, 674 P.2d 396, 400 (1983). In State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 
129,774 P.2d 299, reh 'g denied (1989), a 3 to 2 majority of this Court specifically rejected, as a 
matter of federal law, that which the United States Supreme Court ultirnately acknowledged in 
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002), "that a capital sentencing statute that requires the 
judge to detennine aggravating circumstances takes this factual element out of the jury's hands in 
violation of the sixth amendment." Charboneau at 148, 3 17. 
In light of the uncertainty in death penalty law created by United States Supreme Court 
capital decisions in the post-Furman 1970s, particularly regarding issues concerning penalty 
phase juries, neither Idaho's statutory sentencing scheme's reserving the sentencing 
respo~lsibilities exclusively to the court nor this Court's continued rejection of attacks on it is 
surprising. Indeed, in 1990, the United States Supreme Courl signaled state courts that excluding 
juries from capital sentencing proceedings was constitutionally acceptable. Walton v. Auizona, 
497 U.S. 639 (1990) (no constitutional requirement that a jury must determine whether 
aggravating factors exist). 
Ten year later, the United States Supreme Court overruled Walton, holding that "capital 
defei~dai~ts, no less than noncapital defendants . . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact 
on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment." Ring at 589. 111 
overmli~lg Walton, the Ring holding made plain that Idaho's statutory scheme violated the Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury. See State v. Fetterly, 137 Idaho 729, 730, 52 P.3d 874, 875 
(2002) (Ring "appears to invalidate the death penalty scheme in Idaho which to this time has 
allowed the sentencing judge to make factual findings of the aggravating factors necessary to the 
imposition of a death sentence"). 
C. IDA130 SHOULD REMEDY THE VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S 
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL BY APPLYING RING 
TO A BROADER RANGE OF CASES THAN UNDER THE 
RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE. 
In Danforth, the United States Supreme Court clarified that "the source of a 'new rule' is 
the Constitution itself, not any judicial power to create new rules of law. Accordingly, the 
underlying right necessarily pre-exists [the United States Supreme Court's] articulation of the 
new rule." Id. at 1035. In Ring, the Court did not "create" the right to jury fact-finding of a 
statutory aggravating factor. Rather, it belatedly determined that that right is inherent in the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Indeed, in overruling Walton v. Arizona, 
497 U.S. 639 (1990), the Ring Court acknowledged that it had come down on the wrong side of 
the issue over ten years earlier. Danforth also clarified that the federal retroactivity doctrine 
elluuciated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion), and upon which it relied 
in Schriro v. Sumnzeulin, 542 U.S 348, 352 (2004), to reject the retroactive application of Ring, is 
a federal rule limited in its restrictive application to federal habeas proceedings. Danforth, 128 
S.Ct. at 1038. Thus, the only question Fields presents to this Court is whether Idaho's 
retroactivity doctrine compels the application of Ring's achiowledgment of the right to jury fact- 
finding in a capital case to persons whose convictions and seilteilces were final on June 24,2002, 
the date the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring. 
In the postconviction proceeding below, the district court rejected Fields' efforts to 
enforce his right to have a jury determine whether an aggravating circumsta~~ce existed, without 
which death would not be within the range of sentences available to the state to impose. The 
district court denied relief based on this Court's decisions. In the leading case on the issue, this 
Court unequivocally held: 
Porter asks that we apply a more lenient standard of retroactivity than that applied 
by the United States Supreme Court. In a capital case, jury participation in the 
sentencing process is not required under the Idaho Constitution. State v. Hoffman, 
123 Idaho 638,643,851 P.2d 934,939 (1993); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 
770, 810 P.2d 680,708 (1991). The issue raised by Porter in this application for 
post-coiiviction relief is based solely upon the Federal Constitution. Therefore, the 
retroactivity of that decision is a matter offederal law, not state law. The United 
States Supreme Court has resolved that issue in Summerlin. 
Porter v. State, 140 Idaho at 783, 102 P. 3d at 1102 (emphasis added). In McKinney v. State, the 
Court reaffirmed its Porter holding: 
In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), the 
United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee 
requires that a jury, not a judge, find an aggravating circumstance necessary for 
the imposition of the death penalty. III Schriro v, Sumnzerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358, 
124 S.Ct. 2519,2526, 159 L.Ed.2d 442,453 (2004), the Supreme Court held, " 
Ring annouilced a new procedural rule that does not apply retroactively to cases 
already final on direct review." McKinney aslts us to hold that Ring is retroactive, 
thereby overn~ling Summerlin. The retroactivity of Ring was a matter of federal 
constitutional law, not state law. We have no authority to overrule decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court on issues offederal constitutional law. 
McKinney v. State, 143 Idaho 590, 595, 150 P.2d 283 (2006) (emphasis added), 
The United States Supreme Court specifically acknowledged the state's right to provide a 
remedy to a constitutional right even where the federal courts declined. 
It is thus abundantly clear that the Teague rule of nonretroactivity was fashioned 
to achieve the goals of federal habeas while minimizing federal intrusion into state 
criminal proceedings. It was intended to limit the authority of federal courts to 
overturn state convictions-not to limit a state court's authority to grant relief for 
violations of new rules of constitutional law when reviewing its own State's 
convictions. 
Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S.Ct. at 1041. This Court must acknowledge that Fields was 
sentenced in violation of his constitutional right to trial by jury and that his sentence is, therefore, 
constitutionally infirm. This Court ought to apply Ring retroactively and grant him a new 
sentencing proceeding. 
D. APPLYING THIS COURT'S LONG ESTABLISHED AND 
CONSISTENTLY EMPLOYED PRECEDENT REQUIRING 
THE USE OF A THREE-FACTOR TEST TO SETTLE 
QUESTIONS OF RETROACTIVITY MANDATES THAT 
RING BE GIVEN FULL RETROACTIVE EFFECT. 
This Court first applied the current state test in a criminal case in 1975. State v. Whitman, 
96 Idaho 489, 531 P.2d 579 (1975). When applied here, the three factor test requires that Ring be 
given full retroactive effect. 
As recently as 2006, this Court has held that where controlling precedent on questions of 
Idaho law exists, stare decisis requires that the precedent be followed "'unless it has proven over 
time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious 
principles of law and remedy continued injustice."' Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Co., 142 Idaho 589,592,130 P.3d 1127,1130 (2006) (quoting Houghland Farms, inc. 
v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72,77, 803 P.2d 978,983 (1990). There is no reasoil to depart from this 
Court's longstanding and consistently applied retroactivity precedent. 
1. State v. WIzitman Established the State Retroactivity Test Applicable 
ill this Case. 
This Court first addressed the question of retroactivity in a civil case, finding that a 
statute relating to "a host's liability in a negligently caused accident" was unconstitutional. 
Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19,24,523 P.2d 1365, 1370 (1974). In Thompson, this Court 
identified three approaches to retroactivity: the "traditional rule" under which new decisions are 
applied to "both past and future cases"; the "prospective rule" under which new decisions are 
"effective only in ft~ture actions"; and the "modified prospective rule" under which the new 
decisions apply prospectively "and to the parties bringing the action resulting in the new 
decision[] or, to the parties bringing the action and all similar pending actions." Id. at 25, 523 
P.2d at 1371. To determine which approach to apply in a given case, this Court adopted the 
United States Supreme Court's rationale in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
Thompson, supra. The following year, this Court applied the Linkletter factors in a criminal 
context, firmly establishing the approach to be talcen in determining whether or not a decision is 
to be retroactively applied. Under State v. Whitman, supra, "The Court must weigh: (1) The 
purpose of the new rule; (2) Reliance on the prior decisions of this Court; and (3) The effect of 
the new rule on the administration ofjustice." Id at 491, 531 P.2d at 581 (footnote omitted) 
Later the Court explained that the first factor to be balanced against the other two to determine 
whether to limit the retroactive applicatioi~ of the decision. Jones v. FVutson, 98 Idaho 606, 609, 
570 P.2d 284,287 (1977). As recently as 2004, the Court has employed this three factor test to 
determine whether a new court decision should be given retroactive effect. BHA Investments, Inc. 
v. City ofBoise, 141 Idaho 168, 173, 108 P.3d 315,320 (2004). 
Until Danforth, the sole exception to this Court's use of the three factor test to determine 
a new decision's retroactive effect was where a rule required by the federal constitution 
announced in a United States Supreme Court decision was at issue. When such rules have been 
at issue, the Court consistently restricted its analysis to the application of federal retroactivity 
doctrine. The Court's decisioils regarding the retroactive application of Ring in the individual 
death row inmates' cases currently or previously before this Court reflect that fact. So, too, does 
the Court's identical analysis in all the remaining cases in which the Courl ruled on the 
retroactive applicatioil of Ring. Danforth changed all that. 
2. Applied Here, Idaho's Retroactivity Test Shows That Ring must Be 
Given FuII Retroactive Effect. 
a. Ring's purpose is to preserve both the defendant's and the 
community's right to a jury. 
The aim of the "purpose of the decision" factor is to assess the extent to which the 
decision's purpose "would be served by applying the case to both past and future actions." 
Thompson, 96 Idaho at 25, 523 P.2d at 1371. Put alternatively, the ail11 is to assess the extent to 
which the failure to apply a decision retroactively "would ... thwart[]" its purpose. Gay v. County 
Commissioners ofBonneville County, 103 Idaho 626,631,651 P.2d 560,565 (1982). 
The narrow holding of Ring is that, as a matter of Sixth Amendment law, "[clapital 
defendants, no less than noncapital defendants, . . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact 
on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment." Ring at 588 & 
589. The right to a jury trial is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 
The Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee has a dual purpose of ensuring jury trials to 
individual defenda~~ts and participation in serious trials by the community, thereby ensuring that 
cominunity values are reflected in the sentence imposed 
Thus, one purpose of Ring is to ensme that each potentially death sentenced defendant is 
accorded his or her constitutionally guaranteed right to have a jury determine the existence (or 
non-existence) of any fact necessary to increase his maximum imposable sentence to death from 
a non-death sentence that would be imposable based on his conviction alone. This straight- 
forward purpose would obviously be served by giving Ring full retroactive effect. 
[AJn accused's right to trial by a jury of his fellow citizens when charged with a 
serious criminal offense is unquestionably one of his most valuable and well- 
established safeguards in this country. . . . [Jlurors come from all classes of 
society, they are better calculated to judge of motives, weigh probabilities, and 
take what may be called a common sense view of a set of circumstances. . . than 
any single man, however pure, wise, and eminent he may be. Trial by an 
impartial jury . . . raises another imposing barrier to oppression by government 
offices. . . . The institution of the jury. . . places the real direction of society in the 
hands of the governed . . . and not in that of the government. 
Green v. US . ,  356 U.S. 165,215-16 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., and 
Douglas, J.) (citations, intenlal quotatioil marks, and footnotes omitted). See also, Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004) (framers intended jury to exercise ultimate control in the 
judiciary; u111ess the judge's authority to sentence derives wholly from the jury's verdict, the jury 
cannot exercise the intended control); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 10 (1957) ("Trial by jury in a 
court of law . . . has served and remains one of our most vital barriers to governmental 
arbitrariness. These elemental procedural safeguards were embedded in our Constitution to 
secure their inviolateness and sanctity against the passing demands of expediency or 
convenience."). 
The failure to apply Ring with full retroactivity would thwart its purpose; for having 
denied Mr. Fields the benefit of Ring, the State will execute him pursuant to a death sentence 
which it inlposed based on facts detennined not by a jury but a judge. Mr. Fields and the small 
number of others denied the benefit ofRing will be executed pursuant to a sentence which cannot 
withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
The other purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial and, thus, the other purpose 
of Ring is to ensure community participation in serious criminal trials, thereby ensuring that 
community values are reflected in the se~~tence imposed. This additional aim, imported from 
common law, was to invest the general population with the means to check overreaching and 
othenvise corrupt prosecutorial and judicial decision-making.3 
3Colonists had themselves experienced such oveneaching. "In the 1730s, two successive 
New York grand juries had refused to indict the popular publisher John Peter Zenger-and when 
the government instead proceeded by information, the petit jury famously acquitted. (One of the 
articles for which Zenger was prosecuted had featured ail attack on New Yorlc Governor Cosby 
for having engaged ill personal litigation tactics that sought to evade the right to jury trial in civil 
Because the purpose of the jury is to guard against arbitrary abuses ofpower by 
interposing the commonsense judgment of the community between the State and 
the defendant, the jury venire cannot be composed only of special segments of the 
population. "Connnunity participation in the administration of the criminal law ... 
is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical to public 
confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system." Taylor [v. Louisiana,] 
419 U.S. [522,] 530[.] 
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 314. Guaranteed in Arlicle 3, Section 2 of the United States 
Constitution as well as in its Fifth (grand jury), Sixth (criminal petit), and Seventh (civil) 
Amendments, juries are literally a constitutive elelllent of our Nation's democracy. U.S. Const, 
art. Ill, 52, amends. V, VI, & VII. 
The purpose of tbe jury as a place lor the citizenry's civic involvement did not end with 
the ratification of the Bill of Rights. On the contrary, the United States Supreme Court has 
comparatively recently sounded that theme in its fair jury selection decisions. In Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that, "The harm from 
discriininatory jury selection extends beyond . . . the defendant and the excluded juror to touch 
the entire community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries 
undermine public confideilce in the fairness of our system of justice." Id. at 87. A few years 
later, the United States Supreme Court held tbat defendants have standing to object to the 
prosecution's illegally striking members of a cognizable group even where the defendants 
themselves do not belong to that group. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). The court 
reasoned that in such situations standing exists to, ainong other things, preserve the jury systein 
as a constitutive element of American democracy, along the way highlighting three 
characteristics of the jury systein which make it so. First, because ordinary citizens serve as 
cases.)" Althil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights 84-5 (1998) 
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"'jurors actual or possible"' the people can prevent the jury system's "'arbitrary use or abuse."' 
Id. at 406 (quoting Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298,310 (1992)). Second, the jury system 
"guards the rights of the parties." Id. at 41 I .  Third, it "preserves the democratic eleme~lt of the 
law as it guards the rights of the parties and ensures continued acceptance of the laws by all of 
the people . . . . The verdict will not be accepted or u~lderstood in these terms if the jury is chosen 
by unlawhl means at the outset." Powers at 413. 
b. Juries reflect commuliity norms essential in death cases. 
Additionally, under the Eighth Amendment, sentencing is supposed to reflect community 
values and "a community-based judgment that the sentence constitutes proper retribution." 
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting). See Ring, 536 US., at 613- 
19 (Breyer, J., concunit~g). 
Juries-comprised as they are of a fair cross section of the community-are more 
representative institutions than is the judiciary; they reflect more accurately the 
composition and experiences of the community as a whole, and inevitably make 
decisions based on community values more reliably, than can that segment of the 
community that is selected for service on the bench. 
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,486-487 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (footnote omitted). See also, Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515-526 
(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ( ("The 'higher authority' to whom present-day capital judges 
may be 'too responsive' is a political climate in which judges who covet higher office - or who 
merely wish to remain judges -must constantly profess their fealty to the death penalty 
The danger that they will bend to political pressures whe11 pronouncing sentence in highly 
publicized capital cases is the same danger confronted by judges beholden to King George 
III.")(omitting footnote with citations to newspaper articles as support for the proposition that the 
political climate requires viable judicial and legislative candidates to strongly and clearly support 
the death penalty); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968) (A jury more likely than a 
judge will "express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death." ). 
The purpose of Ring v. Arizona in its preservation of the right to a jury trial weighs 
heavily in favor of application to Mr. Fields' sentence of death. 
3. The State's Reliance on Pre-Ring Law Should Carry 
Little Weight, If Any. 
The second factor the Court considers is the "reliance factor," the extent to which 
litigants and courts generaily have relied on the earlier rule. The more litigants and courts used 
the earlier rule, the greater the reliance. This is especially true in civil cases, where individuals 
and businesses make life and fina~~cial decisions based on the law as it is at the time the decision 
must be made 
a. Reliance is more compelling in civil cases. 
In Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19,523 P.2d 1365 (1974), for example, the decision 
whose retroactivity was at issue invalidated a statute's precluding negligence lawsuits by 
automobile guests against their hosts. The Court found the reliance factor there very strong 
because "[tlhe possibility exists that hosts may have offered rides to guests relying on the 
protection ofthe guest statute from neghgence actions. Additionally, insurance companies may 
have relied upon the guest statute in setting their rates." Thompson, 96 Idaho at 25, 523 P. 2d at 
1371. Thus, the greater the number of hosts and insurance companies which relied in their 
decision making on the guest statute, the stronger the reliance factor. In BHA Investments, the 
new rule whose retroactivity was at issue prohibited cities from imposing liquor license transfer 
fees. The Court analyzed the reliance factor by looking to the number of times the City of Boise 
had relied on its ordinance allowing liquor license transfer fees. Id. at 320, 108 P.3d at 173. 
Similarly, in Balcer v. Shavers, 117 Idaho 696,697,791 P.2d 1275, 1276 (1990), the decision at 
issue "abolished the open and obvious danger doctrine" whereby owners had no duty to lceep 
their premises safe from dangerous conditions which were lcnown or should have been lcnown by 
them. Id. In analyzing the reliance factor, the Court loolted to whether "landowners may have 
allowed dangerous conditions to remain on their property because they believed they had 
protection under our prior decisions" and whether such reliance could have existed in light of a 
relevant statute. Id. 
In each of these cases, the litigants' interests served by reliance were plainly adversarial. 
Most civil cases are zero sum games, i.e.- when one litigant wins, the other loses. Criminal cases 
stand in stark contrast: the State wins when justice is done. B e r g e ~  v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 
88 (1935).4 Standing by a sentence which cannot. withstand constitutional scrutiny is not doing 
justice. The underlying purpose of Idaho Code Section 19-2719's limitations on postconviction 
proceedings in capital cases is to "expedit[e] constitutionally imposed sentences." State v. Beam, 
115 Idaho 208, 210, 766 P.2d 678, 680 (1988) (emphasis added). There is no interest in 
executing zinconstitutionally imposed sentences, thus diminishing any real weight properly given 
to the reliance factor. 
""The [prosecuting attorney] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a 
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as colnpelling as its 
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it 
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
b. Reliance, in spite of foreseeability of change, deserves less 
weight. 
If the prosecuting attorneys and courts relied on the statutory rule without considering 
how that rule would fare under federal col~stitutional analysis, their reliance was misplaced. For 
they knew or should have known that the legislature's enactment was not made in reliance on 
guidance from the United States Supreme C o ~ r t . ~  Indeed, what evidence there was at that time 
strongly disfavored removing juries altogether from sentencing proceedings. Whether the 
"Constitution requires that the death sentence be imposed by a jury" was raised but not addressed 
in Loclett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 609 11.16 (1978). After Furman, the overwhelming majority of 
states with the death penalty had kept juries. Indeed, in upholding the Florida capital statutory 
scheme against the general and broad attack that it violated Furman, the United States Supreme 
Court noted that, under Florida's scheme, "the sentence is determined by the trial judge rather 
than the jury" but nowhere suggested that states could dispense with penalty phase jury fact- 
finding. Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). Until Walton, this Court's later consistent 
rejections of challenges to Idaho's dispensing with the jury altogether for penalty phase purposes 
were not made in reliance on any clear law either. 
However, removing juries from their traditional role resulted from a misunderstanding 
of United States Supreme Court caselaw. See State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362,377, 670 P. 2d 463, 
478 (1 983) (Huntley, J., dissenting) (legislative statement of purpose regarding 1977 statute 
wrongly "suggests that the Supreme Court decisions mandated the removal of the jury from its 
traditional powers and fu~~ctions"); State v. Sival, 105 Idaho 900, 910,674 P.2d 396, 406 (1983), 
Bistline, J. dissenting. ("Following Woodson the legislature set guidelines to follow, and, 
unfortunately believing (as the Statement of Purpose to the proposed 1977 amendment shows, set 
out in the Creech dissenting opinion of Justice Huntley) that the Supreme Court of the United 
States had barred juries from continuing as sentencing authorities, made those guidelines for the 
benefit of judges.") 
It cannot be said that the cl~ange Ring has brought was unforeseeable. See e.g., State v. 
Charboneau, 116 Idaho at 155,774 P.2d at 325 (Huntley, J. and Bistline, J: dissenting) ("The 
plain fact is, before a persoil is eligible to be executed, afinding must be made that the 
aggravating circumstance existed. That finding is typically a jury finding, it was a jury function in 
Idaho from territorial days through 1977, and is a fact to be found by the jury in all but four of the 
states which have the death penalty."). See also, Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F. 2d 101 1 (9" Cir. 
1988) ("We therefore hold that Arizona's aggravating circumstances function as elements of the 
crime of capital murder requiring a jury's determination."). If the reliance by the courts was 
legitimate, it was not without compellil~g warning signals. The question or foreseeability 
diminishes the weight to be given to the reliance factor. See State v. Machen, 100 Idaho 167, 
170, 595 P.2d 316,319 (1979) (where change in law unforeseeable, reliance on earlier law was in 
"good faith"). 
c. There are few remaining cases in which reliance on the pre- 
Ring rule played any role. 
A fully retroactive applicatioll of Ring would affect only a small number of cases. See 
infra at n.6 and accompanying text. Thus, the weight accorded the reliance factor should 
likewise be small. A decision from this Court extending the retroactive effect of Ring to cases 
already final will be "of limited applicability and will affect only those criminal defendants 
currently [sentenced] in Idaho under the prior statutory scheme." Gafford v. State, 127 Idaho 
472,475, 903 P.2d 61, 64, reh gdenied (1995). 
Of course, even had the reliance been greater, the weight given that factor would not 
outweigh the right to a constitutionally imposed death sentence 
4. Application of Ring to Petitioners Will Have a Substantial Positive but 
Minimal Negative, If Any, Impact on the Administration of Justice. 
"This factor talces into account the number of cases that would be reopened if the decision 
[at issue] is applied retroactively." Thonzpsoiz v. Ifagan, 96 Idaho at 25, 523 P.2d at 1371 (1974). 
See, Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606,609,570 P.2d 284,287 (Idaho 1977) (where the decision at 
issue struck a statute of liinitations tolling rule, the Court noted that it was "convinced that [a] 
minimal number of cases will proceed to trial solely because of a prospective application of the 
[decision], and thus the impact on the administration of justice will be slight."). Unlike 
Thompson where the Court was left to speculate on how many hosts and insurance companies 
had relied on the guest statute and in Balcer where it was left to speculate whether landowners 
had allowed dangerous conditions to go unrepaired in reliance on the earlier rule, here the 
number of cases affected by the reliance is ltnown: eleven or, depending on the outcome of the 
federal district court's order granting sentencing relief in one case, possibly t w e l ~ e . ~  
The Idaho Department of Correction reports that as of June, 2008, there were 7,817 Idaho 
offenders serving prison sentences. See Idaho Department of Correction Standard Reports For 
June 2008 (viewable at:httu:/lwww.idoc.idaho.eov/facts/montl statslSta11dReportJuneO8~pdf ). 
"ee http:l/w.corr.state.id.us/faclsideath row.htin (Idaho Department of Corrections 
website, last visited 6/4/09), There are seventeen death sentenced individuals in Idaho. Five of 
those individuals stand to gain nothing hom Ring because each of their sentencing (or 
resentencing) proceedings included or will include juries. They are Timothy Dunlap, Dale 
Shacltelford, Darrell Payne, Erick Hall, and Azad Abdullah. The website iilcludes Richard 
Leavitt as a death sentenced inmate when, in fact, the United States District Court granted him 
sentencing relieE Leavitt v. Arave, USDC Case CV 93-0024-S-BLW (Judgment, Dkt.# 297, 
9\28/07). In November, 2007, that court stayed its order and associated matters until the State's 
appeal to the Ninth Circuit is complete. Thus, depending on the outcome of Mr. Leavitt's case, a 
ruling that Ring applies retroactively will affect at most 12 Idaho prisoners. 
Of these, four hundred eleven inmates were, as of June, 2008, incarcerated for murder and 
manslaughter convictions. The eleven or twelve inmates who stand illegally sentenced to death 
represent 0.14% or 0.15% of the total number of Idaho offenders serving prison sentences, and 
2.6% or 2.9% of the total number of Idaho offenders incarcerated for murder and manslaughter. 
This Court has previously allowed retroactive application where it would add a relatively 
small number of cases to the district courts' dockets. See e.g., Bergman v. Heniy, 115 Idaho 259, 
263,766 P. 2d 729,733 (1988) (retroactively applying a new rule finding that a cause of action 
lies against a licensed vendor of intoxicating bevcrages for the wrongful death of and persolla1 
injuries to third parties caused by the continued serving of alcohol to the patron of the bar). In 
particular, acknowledging that the retroactive application at issue "may require the retrial of 
some cases[,]" the Court noted that it was "confident that our efficient and hardworking trial 
judges will be able to accommodate the relatively few cases that must be retried because of the 
change in the law[.]" Baler, 117 Idaho at 698, 791 P.2d at 1277 (Idaho 1990).7 Based on the 
Indeed, the system has already absorbed without disruption the resentencings of no less 
than 14 persons originally sentenced to death whose sentences were reversed for a number of 
statutory andlor constitutional errors and later sentenced to life. See e.g., State v. Osborne, 102 
Idaho 405,631 P.2d 187 (1981); State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546,873 P.2d 800 (1993); State v. 
Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,774 P.2d 299 (1989); State v. [ B ~ a n ]  Lanltford, 127 Idaho 608, 
903 P.2d 1305 (1995); State v. [Mark] Lanword, 468 F.3d 578 (9'h Cir. 2006); State v. Hoffman, 
236 F.3d 523 (9"' Cir. 2001); State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 73, 90 P.3d 298 (2004); State v. Ivey, 
123 Idaho 74,844 P.2d 703 (1992); Paradis v. Arave, 954 F.2d 1483 (9Ih Cir. 1992); Gibson v. 
Auave, Nos. 98-99020 & 98-9902 1 (settled), Barrajas v. State, Amended Judgment and Order, 
Case No. CR-92-64 (D.Ct. Payette Cty. 2/2/95); Paz v. Arave, Order Case No. 93-132, Dkt. #49 
(D.Ct. Idaho 101311996); State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 716 P.2d 1182 (1985); Fetterly v. 
State, Order, Case No. 89-1 106 (D.Ct. Idaho 61611999) (granting sentencing relief); Beam v. 
Arave, 966 F.2d 1563, amended (9Ih Cir. 1992) (granting sentencing relief). Additionally, 
resentencings were ordered in light of Ring by Idaho dishict courts in the cases of Jimmie V. 
Thomas (Jerome County), Michael A. Jauhola (Ada County), and Dale Schackleford (Latah 
County), and by this Court in State v. Fetterly, 137 Idaho 729,52 P.3d 874, reh denied (Idaho 
2002),and State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53,90 P.3d 278 (2003). 
very small number of cases at stake here, the administration of justice factor weighs strongly in 
favor of retroactively applying Ring. 
The Court also has the authority to prevent the need for resentencing proceedings in those 
few cases by reducing the sentences to the maximum legal tenn. See, State v. Lindquist, 99 
Idaho 766,589 P.2d 101 (1979) (when defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder, he was 
necessarily found guilty of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder; accordingly, 
despite the fact that defendant could not be sentenced under the unconstitutional death penalty 
statute then in effect or under the unconstitutional preamendment version, it was appropriate to 
remand the cause to district court for resentencing to any punishment permitted for conviction of 
the lesser included offense of second-degree murder); State v. Creech, 99 Idaho 779, 589 P.2d 
114 (1979) (remanded for resentencing consistent with State v. Lindquist); see also, State v. 
Movris, 131 Idaho 263,267, 954 P.2d 681,685 (1998) (district court's Rule 35 motion denial 
reversed, and appellant's senteilce modified to bring it within legal limits). 
Finally, administration of justice analysis cannot be merely by the numbers. It must also 
take into account the need to maintain the public's coiltiiluing respect for judicial decisions 
through justice and equitable outcomes. The jury injects a democratic element into the law. This 
element is vital to the effective administration of criminal justice, not only in safeguarding the 
rights of the accused, but in encouraging popular acceptance of the law and the necessary general 
acquiescence in their application. Green v. US. ,  356 U.S. 165,215-16 (1958) (Black, J., 
dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.) (citations, internal quotation marks, and 
footnotes omitted). Far from maintaining the public's continuing respect for the judiciary, 
treating similarly situated individuals dissimilarly based on fortuity creates a lack of trust -which 
is, of course, precisely the reason why the Constitutioil and Bill of Rights guarantee jury trials. 
The Whitnzan test mandates that Ring be applied retroactively to Mr. Fields 
E. THE FEDERAL COURTS' RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE OF  TEAGUE 
K LANE SHOULD NOT BE ADOPTED BY THE STATE OF IDAHO. 
The purpose of the bar in Teague does not speak to the concerns of this Court in 
determining whether to apply Ring to Petitioners. First, as the United States Supreme Court has 
recently explained, Teague was adopted to limit federal habeas corpus relief based on the need 
for comity and respect for finality of state court convictions in our federalist system. "If 
anything, considerations of comity inilitate in favor of allowing state courts to grant habeas relief 
to a broader class of individuals than is required by Teague. And while finality is, of course, 
implicated in the context of state as well as federal habeas, finality of state convictioils is a state 
interest, not a federal one. It is a matter that States are free to evaluate, and weigh the importance 
of, when prisoners held in state custody are seeking a remedy for a violation of federal rights by 
their lower cou~-ts." Danfo~tI? at 1041 (emphasis added). 
Rather than adopting Teague, this Court should maintain its consistent independent 
examination, reasoning, and insistence on charting Idaho's own legal pathways. As the Court has 
explained in the context of coilstitutional doctrine: 
We do not suggest, however, that if federal courts were to change 
these rules we would likewise change ours, unless, of course, our 
rules were now held to violate the federal constitution. . . Long 
gone are the days when state courts will blindly apply United 
States Supreine Court interpretation and methodology when in the 
process of interpreting their own constitutions. 
State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 11 n.6,696 P.2d 856, 862 31.6 (1985).% State v. Guzman, 122 
Idaho 981,842 P.2d 660 (Idaho 1992), this Court refused to adopt the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule because to do so would constitute "an independent constitutional violation by 
the court in addition to the violation at the time of the illegal search," and recognized that 
"judicial integrity mandated the exclusionary rule." Id. at 992, 842 P.2d at 671. Similarly, 
"judicial integrity" now mandates the retroactive application of the right to a jury fact-finding in 
a capita1 sentencing. To do otlielwise would constitute "an independent constitutional violation 
by this Cou~t, in addition to the violation at the time of the" unconstitutional capital sentencing. 
Id. 
For these same reasons, adopting Teagzke without first examining whether it is a sound 
retroactivity doctrine for cases on collateral review would also risk the unexpected expenditure of 
state resources. 
Even when this Court accepted a similar search and seizure 'expectation of privacy" in 
garbage as delineated by the federal courts, it noted that in the cases in which this Court has 
found that the Idaho Constitution provides greater protection than the United States Constitution, 
it has done so "on the uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing 
jurisprudence." State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469,473,20 P.3d 5,8 (2001). Idaho's long-standing 
jurisprudence on retroactive application of fundamental rights requires granting to Mr. Fields 
'See State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981,988, 842 P.2d 660,667 (1992) (rejecting federal 
good faith exception to exclusionary rule); State v. Webb, 130 Idaho 462,467, 943 P.2d 52, 57 
(1997) (adopting broader test for scope of curtilage than required by the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution): State v. Thomason. 114 Idaho 746, 749. 760 P.2d 1162, 1165 , . 
(1988) (holding that Idaho Constitution requires more than Fourth hmeidment regarding pen 
registers, i.e.- that a warrant based on probable cause must be obtained before law enforcement 
may use a pen register) 
what the vast majority of death row inmates have and will enjoy. Beyond that, the even longer 
history in which juries were involved in the sentencing process in capital cases invites the 
retention of its current retroactivity doctrine rather than the limitations Teague imposes. There is 
nothing in Teague 's efforts, to limit the remedies available in federal habeas and promote comity 
and finality, that undermines this Court's continued adherence to its established principles and 
commitment to justice. 
1. The Right to a Jury Trial Is a Fundamental Right. 
Just as the importance of the right to a jury trial speaks in favor of honoring that 
constitutional right retroactively, it speaks against the reasonableiless of relying on Teague to bar 
its application to Mr. Fields' death sentence. As noted in greater detail above and acknowledged 
in Sunzmevli~z, the right to a jury trial is fundamental and thus, "implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty," implicating "fu~damental fairness." Id., 542 U.S. at 358 ("the right to jury trial is 
fundamental to our system of criminal procedure and States are bouiid to enforce the Sixth 
hnei1dn1ent's guarantees as we interpret them"); see also, 542 U.S. at 359 (Breyer, J. dissenting) 
("The majority does not deny that Ring meets the first criterion, that its holding is "implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty." ). 
2. The Teague Retroactivity Doctrine Violates Federal and State 
Equal Protection and Due Process Guarantees on Their Faces 
And as Applied. 
Any retroactivity doctrine which denies the benefit of a new rule to some petitioners 
while allowing it to others based on a foiluitous difference violates a guiding principle of state 
and federal equal protection and due process guarantees: it fails to treat relevantly similar cases 
similarly. Further, state action violates the fundamental fairness due process guarantee when it 
"violates those 'fundan~ental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political 
institutions,' Mooney v. I$olohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935), and which define 'the community's 
sense of fair play and decency,' Rochin v. California, [342 U.S. 165,] 173 [1952]." Dowling v. 
Uncted States, 493 U.S. 342, 353 (1990). 
The United States Supreme Court has loilg held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial in serious criminal cases is a fundamental right the infriilgement of which violates the 
fundamental fairness guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. In Duncan 
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). "[Tlhe right to jury trial in serious criminal cases is a 
fundamental right and hence must be recognized by the States as part of their obligation to 
extend due process of law to all persons within their jurisdiction." Id. at 154. The Court recently 
reaffiimed this, in a decisioil written by Justice Scalia, holding that the Sixth Amendment right to 
trial by jury "is fundamental to our system of crimiilal procedure, and States are bound to enforce 
the Sixth Amendment's guarantees as we interpret them." Sumnzerlin, 542 U.S. at 358. 
The due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states froin infringing 
fundamental rights unless "'narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."' Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,721 (1997) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,302 (1993)). 
Similarly, the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids states from either 
classifying people or applying laws such that only soine individuals may exercise a fundamental 
right, unless the classification or application is narrowly tailored to serve some compelling state 
interest. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450,458 (1988) (when law 
interferes with a fundamental right, it triggers strict scrutiny review); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.S. 356, 373 (1886) ("whatever. . . the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are applied. . . 
with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the state of that equal 
protection of the laws which is secured . . . by the . . . [Flourteenth [A]mendme~lt[.]"). 
Applying Idaho's retroactivity test as described above or any other test in a way that 
denies Mr. Fields the benefit of Ring because his conviction and sentence was final when Ring 
was decided would violate his state and federal equal protection and due process rights. It would 
violate those rights because it would deny his fundamental right to a jury trial without any 
compelling state interest being served. The State has no interest, let alone a compelling one, to 
see its citizens executed pursuant to a sentence which cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
Denying full retroactivity to fundamental rights, regardless oftheir implications upon fact- 
finding accuracy, violates due process and equal protection under black letter law. The United 
States Supreme Court has not resolved whether a retroactivity doctrine which grants or denies 
relief in a case depending on the fortuity of the date of the judgment's finality, as does Idaho's, 
violates federal constitutional equal protection or due process guarantees. U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV. 
To deny the retroactive application of Ring in Idaho where a dozen individuals may be 
executed having been deprived the right to a jury in the determination of their death-eligibility is 
morally inexplicable and defies the principles of uniformity and equity. 
Consider, for example, the cases of Messrs. Fetterly and Fields. First degree murder 
prosecutio~ls were co~n~nenced against Mr. Fetterly in 1983 and Mr. Fields in 1988. Based on 
Ring, Mr. Fetterly's sentence was overturned in 2002. Yet the State charged Mr. Fetterly six 
years before it charged Mr. Fields. 
The reason Mr. Fetterly received the benefit of Ring was not based on anything other than 
the chance event that the federal courts ordered that Fetterly be resentenced, and his direct appeal 
from that resentencing was not final when Ring was decided. State v. Fetterly, 137 Idaho 729, 
730, 52 P.3d 874, 875 (2002). 
If this Court adopts the Teague doctrine or any other retroactivity doctrine that bars 
retroactive application based on fortuitous events, Mr. Fields, this Court, and Idaho will never 
lcnow if a jury would have found him eligible for a death se~ltence. 
A fact is beyond dispute: both Fields and Fetterly completed the direct appeal of their 
conviction and sentence before Ring was decided. The difference between thein - that Fetterly 
was granted resentencing proceedings while Mr. Fields has not - is fortuitous. That Mr. Fields 
die due simply to the uncertain pace of litigation is undoubtedly not the intent of this Court and 
certainly is not illustrative of this State's commitment to justice and fair play. Where two 
prisoners are in every important respect identically situated, the ordinary citizen will not 
understand only one receiving Ring relief. "[Tlhe ordinary citizen . . . will simply witness two 
iildividuals, both sentenced through the use of unconstitutional procedures, one individual going 
to his death, the other saved, all through an accident of timing." Summevlin at 364 (Breyer J., 
dissei~ting). See also, Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51,63 (1985) ("Under the majority's rule, 
otherwise identically situated defendants inay be subject to different constitutioilal rules, 
depending on just how long ago now-unconstitutional conduct occurred and how quickly cases 
proceed through the criminal justice system.") (White, J, dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J, and 
O'Connor, J). 
Teague and other retroactivity doctrines which turn on fortuity are unsound for cases on 
collateral review in state court. This Court should not employ a procedural bar based on 
technical differences wholly unattributable to the petitioner. Where a life hangs in the balance, 
as Mr. Fields' does here, it violates due process and equal protection guarantees to place a heavy 
thurnb on the prosecution's side of the scales. 
F. IDAHO CODE §2719(5)(C)'S ANTI-RETROACTIVITY PROVISION HAS 
NO APPLICATION HERE. 
Petitioner aclcnowledges that Idaho Code Section 19-2719(c) provides that, "A successive 
post-conviction pleading . . . shall be deemed facially insufficient to the extent it seeks 
retroactive application of new rules of law." Id. at 19-2719(5)(c). Given the extraordinary 
circumstances presented here, Fields nevertlieless seeks postconviction relief through the 
retroactive application of Ring, contending that Section 2719(5)(c) may not properly preclude 
successive postconviction petitions in this case, 
There are four reasons for this. First, Section 19-2719(5)(c) violates the Idaho 
Constitution's separation of powers requirement. Second, Idaho law prohibits retroactively 
applying Section 19-2719(5)(c) to these cases. Third, Section 19-2719(5)(c) violates state and 
federal Equal Protection and Due Process guarantees. Fourth, that statutory provision's 
application in the instant case would violate the United States Constitution's guarantee of a 
republican f o m ~  of state government 
1. Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(C) Violates the Idaho Constitution 
Separation of Powers Requirement. 
Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) plainly aims to limit the jurisdiction of district courts, 
which the Idaho Constitution provides is "original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in 
equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law." By limiting the district 
court's jurisdiction, the statute runs afoul of the Idaho Constitution's mandate that the branches 
of govemment maintain separation of powers. That mandate is found in two places in the Idaho 
Constitution, Article 2, Section 1, and Article 5, Section 13. 
It is settled that a Section 19-2719 proceeding "is a proceeding entirely new and 
independent from the criminal action which led to the conviction." Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 
534, 536, 716 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1986). Article V, Section 13's mandate that the legislature 
"provide a proper system of appeals" does not extend to Section 19-2719 proceedings because 
they are not appeals. 
As applied to Section 19-2719(5)(c), Article V, Section 13's reservation of legislative 
power cannot be squared with its prohibition against the legislature's depriv[ing] "the judicial 
department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of 
govemment." There are at least two reasons for this. First, this Court has long held that, "the 
powers reserved to the several departments of the government, but not specifically enumerated in 
the constitution, must be defined in the context of the common law. State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 
236, 240,486 P.2d 247, 251 (1971)." State v. Branson, 128 Idaho 790, 792,919 P.2d 319,321 
(1996). If the courts possessed the authority at comlnon law, then it "may not properly be 
abrogated by statute." Id. At common law, new constitutional decisions were given full 
retroactive effect. Thus, "[alt common law there was no authority for the proposition that 
judicial decisions made law only for the future. Blaclcstone stated the rule that the duty of the 
court was not to 'pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one.' 1 Blackstone, 
Commentaries 69 (1 5"' ed. 1809)" Linlclettev v. Walker, 381 U S .  618, 622-23 (1965) (footnote 
omitted). Thus, because at common law the judiciary had authority to consider claims requiring 
retroactive application of new rules of law and because Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) 
purports to remove from district courts their authority to hear such claims, that statutory 
provision must be struck as offending Idaho Constitution Article V, Section 13. 
This Court has consistently rejected past legislative efforts to restrict the judiciary's 
jurisdiction. In State v. Interest of Lindsey, 78 Idaho 241,246, 300 P.2d 491,494 (1956), this 
Court struck a statute purporting to transform previously criminal matters of juveniles into civil 
matters because "[tlhe legislature, by denoting as a civil matter what the law has previously 
regarded as a felony, attempt[ed] to take away jurisdiction vested in the district court by the 
constitution itself, and . . . attempted to render that court powerless to do anything about the 
prosecution of such persons." Similarly, in Boise City v. Better Homes, Inc., 72 Idaho 441,444- 
45,243 P.2d 303,304 (1952), this Court held that "[tlhe original jurisdiction conferred upon the 
district court by the constitution, Art. 5, $20, cannot be diminished by the legislature. Const. Art. 
5, §13[.]" Again, in Clemons v. Kinsley, 72 Idaho 251,256-57,239 P.2d 266,269 (1951), the 
Court held that "[tlhe broad jurisdiction [created by Arlicle 5, Section 131 is not subject to 
diminution by legislative act." The Court held the same thing in Robinson v. Robinson, 70 Idaho 
122, 127,212 P.2d 1031, 1033-34 (1949). Finally, in McKnight v. Grant, 13 Idaho 629,637,92 
P. 989,990 (1907), the Court held that, "We think [Article 5, Section13] was . . . intended to 
preserve to tbe judicial department of the state govemnent the right and power to finally 
determine controversies between parties involving their rights and upon whose claims some 
decision or judgment must be rendered or determination made." In short, this Court has 
consistently and long held that the legislature inay not directly or otherwise restrict the district 
court's jurisdiction. Consequently, Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) caimot stand as a bar to 
granting Ring full retroactive application. 
2. Established Idaho Law Prohibits Retroactively Applying Idaho Code 
Section 19-2719(5)(C). 
The Idaho Code provides that, "No part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless 
expressly so declared." I.C. $73-101. With regard to amendinei~ts to existing statutes, they "will 
not, absent an express legislative statement to the contrary, be held to be retroactive in 
application. .Johnson v. Sloddard, 96 Idaho 230,526 P.2d 835 (1974)[.]" Nebelcer v. Piper 
Aircrafl Corporation, 113 Idaho 609, 614,747 P.2d 18,23 (1987) (citations omitted). In 1995, 
subsectioi~ (5)(c) was amended into Idaho Code Section 19-2719. This ainendment was Section 
3 of Chapter 140 (S.B. 1084) of the 1995 Idaho Session Laws. The Act containiilg the 
anlendinent did not contain any express statement that the amendment or any other part of the 
Act should be applied retroactively. Thus, Idaho Code Section 73-101 precludes Section 19- 
2719(5)(c)'s retroactive application to the instant case. 
Though Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) expressly purports to absolutely bar 
postconvictioil petitioners' claiins dependent on retroactively applying a new rule of law, it 
contains no express legislative statement that it should itself be retroactively applied. It cannot, 
then, be applied to the case at bar. 
3. Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(C) Violates Petitioner's Rights to Due 
Process and Equal Protection Guaranteed Under the United States 
and Idaho Constitutions. 
If Petitioners did not stand under sentence of death, Idaho Code Section19-2719(5)(c)'s 
anti-retroactivity provision would not apply. The Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act 
("UPCPA") govenls non-capital postconvictio~l proceedings. LC. 519-4901 et seg. The UPCPA 
provides that '>post-conviction reliefis not barred where new evidence is discovered, or where 
later case law suggests a conviction is unlawful." Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,766 n.12,760 
P.2d 1174, 1182 11.12 (1988) (citing I.C.5 19-4901) (emphasis added). The Act also provides 
that a claim can only be waived ifthe waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent. I.C. $19- 
4908; McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700-01,992 P.2d 144, 149-50 (1999). However, in 
addition to the UPCPA, the statutory scheme governing capital postcoi~viction cases includes 
Idaho Code Section 19-271 9. This Court has held that, "LC. 5 19-271 9 does not eliminate the 
applicability of the UPCPA to capital cases, but it supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their 
provisions conflict." McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700,992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999). Because 
Section 19-2719(5)(c) would not preclude the application of Ring to Petitioners were they not 
sentenced to death, that statutory provision violates Petitioners' due process and equal protection 
rights. 
Enforcing Section 19-2719(5)(c) against Petitioners would violate their rights to equal 
protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
and Article 1, Sections 2 and 13 of the Idaho Co~lstitution because the disparate treatment of 
capital and non-capital postconviction petitioners is not necessary to promote a compelling state 
interest. Alternatively, it would violate their rights to equal protection and due process under the 
same authorities because there is no rational basis for the disparate treatment. Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620, 631-36 (1996) (amendment to Colorado Constitution that prohibited all legislative, 
executive, or judicial action designed to protect homosexual persons from discrimination 
violated equal protection c l a~se ) .~  
At issue is the disparity in the manner in which fundamental rights are enforced in Idaho 
postconviction proceedings, depending on whether the actions are being prosecuted by capital or 
non-capital petitioners. The fundamental rights at stake here are the right to fairness in the 
criminal process and the right to fairness in procedures for enforcing claims concerning 
governmental deprivations of life or liberty.'' Where fundamental rights are at stake, the 
'See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,446-51 (1985) (Requiring 
a special use permit for proposed group home for the mentally retarded violated equal protection 
clause in that requirement, in absence of any rational basis in record for believing that group 
home would pose any special threat to city's legitimate interests, appeared to rest on an irrational 
prejudice against inentally retarded); Zobel v. Williains, 457 U.S. 55, 61-64 (1982) (holding that 
"the Alaslca dividend distribution plan violates the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment."); U.S.D.A. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,535 (1973) (Provision of the 
Food Stamp Act which excludes from participation any household containing an individual who 
is unrelated to any other member of the household creates an irrational classificatioil in violation 
of the equal protection conlponent of the due process clause of the FiRh Amendment); Sterling 
H. Nelson &Sons, Inc. v. Bender, 95 Idaho 813,814-16, 520 P.2d 860, 861-63 (1974) (holding 
that subsectio~l setting out higher weight limits for haulers of unprocessed agricultural 
commodities than haulers of processed agricultural coinmodities was unconstitutional as 
discriminatory.) 
'oDouglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,356-58 (1963) (holding that indigent defendants 
were denied equal protection of the law where merits of their one appeal they had as of right 
from their convictions are decided without benefit of counsel); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 
194-98 (1971) (Distinction drawn by Illinois Supreme Court Rule which provided trial 
transcripts only in felony cases was 'unreasoned distinction' proscribed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (holding "that the fundamental 
constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the 
preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law 
libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law."); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 
19 (1956) (State must provide corrective rules to overcome denial to the poor of an adequate 
appellate review granted to all who have inoney enough to pay the costs in advance. See Ronald 
D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law $15.7 (4th ed. 2007). 
discriminatory scheme must be assessed with strict scrutiny." The stated purpose of the 
offending statute, to eliminate purportedly unnecessary delay in canying out valid death 
sentences, is not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify the violation of Petitioner's 
fundamental rights by carrying out an undisputedly invalid death sentence. The disparity in 
enforcement mecl~anisins is not necessary to any compelling state interest. 
4. Applying Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) Would Violate The 
Federal Constitution's Guarantee Of A Republican Form Of State 
Government. 
The United States Constitution guarantees that state government will be republican in 
form. U.S. Const. Art. 4, 54. Petitioners concede that it is unclear whether the Guarantee Clause 
accords federal courts authority to review the internal allocations of power within a state. 
Largess v. Supreme Judicial Court,for the State of Massachusetts, 373 F.3d 219,227 (1" Cir. 
2004) (comparing Bush v. Gore, 53 1 U.S. 98, 1 12 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring, joined by 
Scalia and Thomas, JJ.) (Guarantee Clause allows such review) with id. at 123-24 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting, joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.) ("Nothing in Article I1 ... frees the state legislature 
from the constraints in the State Constitution that created it."). Petitioners also concede that not 
every state law separation of powers violation constitutes a Guarantee Clause violation. 
"See Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 126, 15 P.3d 1129, 
1134 (2000) (if a fundamental right is at issue, appropriate standard of review of law infringing 
on that right is strict scrutiny); Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 71 1,714,535 P.2d 1348, 1351 (1975) 
(strict scrutiny when statute's classification infringes upon a fundamental right); State v. Breed, 
11 1 Idaho 497, 500, 725 P.2d 202, 205 (Ct. App. 1986) (strict scrutiny of statutory schemes that 
infringe upon a '"fundamental right' such as voting, procreation, or constitutional safeguards for 
persons accused of crimes"). See generally, Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowalt, Treatise On 
Coiistitutional Law § 18.41 at 800-01(3'd ed. 1999) ("When the govenunent taltes actions that 
burden the rights of a classification of persons in terms of their treatment in a criminal justice 
system it is proper to review these laws under the strict scrutiny standard for equal protection."). 
However, Petitioners contend that some state law violations do violate the Guarantee Clause. 
Specifically, where a state govenment provides no form of redress for an egregious state law 
separation of powers violation, that state law violation constitutes a Guarantee Clause violation. 
Where a separation of powers violatioil precludes sentencing relief in cases where lives hang in 
the balance, as in Petitioners' cases before the Court, the violation is egregious and constitutes a 
Guarantee Clause violation. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Mr. Fields' death sentence should be vacated and the case should be 
remanded to the district court for resentencing consistent with the principles announced in Ring 
v. Arizona. 
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